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This paper compares welfare levels under alternative fiscal rules for small open, commodity 
exporter,  economies  whose  fiscal  income  varies  with  the  world  commodity  price  (in  a 
dynamic, stochastic, and general equilibrium setting). Between the extremes of a procyclical 
balanced budget policy and an acyclical spending rule, there is a continuum of rules. Thus, 
the best degree of spending stabilization is found. The acylical rule benefits households that 
do not enjoy access to capital markets by providing a financial cushion that they themselves 
cannot  provide,  boosting  their  mean  consumption.  However,  households  that  enjoy  full 
access to capital markets suffer under this rule, since the government reduces their role in 
smoothing consumption and accumulating assets. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most available evidence suggests that, in emerging/developing economies, fiscal policy is 
procyclical (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, (2004), Talvi and Végh, (2005)). Government 
consumption typically increases and taxes often fall during expansions, while the opposite 
often happens during recessions. Moreover, in countries whose exports are concentrated in 
one  or  a  few  primary  resource based  commodities,  government  expenditures  often  move 
closely with the world prices of these exports. Thus, as Figure 1 suggests, in such countries, 
higher  volatility  of  government  spending  is  associated  with  higher  commodity  price 
volatility. Of course, past fiscal indiscipline may play a role in procyclical fiscal behavior. 
Procyclical spending cuts often occur not only when commodity prices fall, but also after a 
buildup of public debt.
 Moreover, as Figure 2 suggests, spending shocks often have broader 
spillover effects, insofar as higher volatility in government spending is typically linked to 
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2 In a related vein, Talvi, and Végh (2005) argue that pressures to increase public spending in 
countries that face large swings in their tax base, as is the case in many developing countries, 
are the cause of running a procyclical fiscal policy. Gavin et al (1996) and Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) have attributed this procyclical bias to the fact that developing countries are rationed 
from international credit markets in bad times.  
 
Figure 1. Volatility of the Commodity Price Growth 
and Government Spending Growth   
 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, United Nations and Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency;   Major 
commodities  by  country  are:  Copper  (Chile,  Zambia),    Soy  (Paraguay),  Gold  (Peru,  South  Africa),  
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In this way, fiscal volatility may affect consumer welfare. For example, fiscal shocks may 
affect private consumption. Households that do not enjoy access to capital markets—“hand 
to mouth” or “non Ricardian” households—are especially vulnerable in this aspect. Without 
their own financial buffer stocks, such households cannot smooth their consumption. Hence, 
when government spending falls, their disposable income and consumption fall with it. By 
contrast, households that do have access to capital markets—“Ricardian” optimizers—are 
better  positioned  to  cushion  themselves  against  such  shocks.  To  the  extent  that  these 
households have a precautionary motive (i.e. their utility function has a third moment), they 
will save and acquire a cushion of assets.   
    
Governments may wish to protect these more vulnerable “hand to mouth” households from 
fiscal volatility. This implies that the government links its expenditures to steady state, not 
current, revenues. Moreover, the government would acquire the precautionary cushion of 
assets  on  behalf  of  these  consumers—something  they  cannot  do  for  themselves.  Ideally, 
government policy should be a sequence of taxes and transfers whose magnitudes would 
yield  exactly  the  hypothetical  sequence  of  consumption  by  households  if  were  in  fact 
“Ricardian.” However, such a policy may be difficult to implement, since the government 
may  not  know  what  household  preferences  are.  As  a  more  practical  alternative,  some 
commodity  exporting  countries  have  simply  chosen  to  reduce  fiscal  volatility  by 
implementing a fiscal rule that breaks the link between current commodity prices and public 
spending. While such rules may be ad hoc in nature, they may be easier to communicate and 
implement  than  other  more  complicated  policies  (like  the  tax  /  transfer  scheme).    This 
reflects Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) suggestion that a fiscal rule should be transparent and 
easily understood so as to transparent and easily understood.   
 
Figure 2. Volatility of GDP and Government Spending Growth 
Source: See Figure 1.    4 
The  goal of this paper is to examine how both the level of  government demand and its 
volatility affect consumer welfare. Our perspective is more theoretical than empirical, even 
though we use a calibrated model. In our model, the role of the government is to some extent 
limited because there are two sources of government revenue: lump sum taxes (assumed to 
be  constant  and  policy  invariant)  and  export  revenue,  which  comes–manna  like–from  a 
resource based commodity (in our model, copper) whose world determined price fluctuates 
randomly.  
 
The government serves merely as a conduit for the manna. Its only choice is how much to 
spend and when to spend it on purchases of imports and domestic goods / services. Since the 
latter are supplied by households, government spending raises domestic household income. 
Otherwise, government expenditures are assumed to be inherently useless; they appear in 
neither utility nor production functions.  
 
The fiscal rule determines how much the government spends and when. Hence, a fiscal rule 
affects both the level and volatility of government spending. We emphasize several desirable 
characteristics of a fiscal rule. First, a fiscal rule should be easily understood, consistent with 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) idea. .Second, the rule should reduce volatility and provide a 
precautionary cushion of assets for the most vulnerable (i.e. “hand to mouth”) households. 
(The idea that the government should be a net creditor is not new; see for example Ayiagari, 
Marcet, Sargent, and Seppäla (2002)).Third, and in a related vein, the government’s net asset 
position – debtor or creditor – must be bounded. The government’s net creditor (or debtor) 
position should not grow without limit. 
3   
 
A balanced budget rule is perhaps the easiest rule to understand: expenditures must always 
equal revenues. However, such a rule is inherently procyclical: it brings volatility that is 
detrimental to vulnerable households. By contrast, some countries, for example Chile has 
adopted an acyclical (or structural surplus) rule in which expenditures are linked to steady 
state (rather than current) commodity revenue, see Figure 3. This policy permitted Chile to 
reduce its public debt and even attain a net credit position in recent years. During the 2009 








                                                 
3 This is related to, but not the same as, the “no Ponzi game” condition which specifies that 
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We show that an acyclical rule has an inherent bias toward attaining a bounded net creditor 
position. In adopting such a rule, the government effectively acts as if it had a precautionary 
savings motive. Importantly, such a rule has an important effect on the consumers’ saving 
spending decisions and therefore the degree of acyclicality can be calibrated to obtain welfare 
improvements. The net assets position serves as an extra financial cushion for the “hand to 
mouth” households—a kind of publicly provided precautionary savings that such households 
are unable to provide for themselves. However, under this policy, the government also reaps 
a ‘dividend’ that helps it to boost spending. In order to ensure that public asset growth is 
bounded, i.e. the  “dividend” is bounded as well, we assume in the rule that  government 
spending decreases when fiscal debt rises. 
 
Under a balanced budget rule, spending fluctuates around a fixed mean. By contrast, under 
the acyclical rule, the government spends less in the early years and more later– and it does 
so on a smoother path. Also, these two types of rules are easily shown to be special cases of a 
more general fiscal rule – two specific points on a continuum of fiscal rules. We use this 
continuum to measure the impact on welfare of different types of acyclical rule. 
 
Welfare is measured in terms of steady state consumption (Lucas, 1987, Schmitt Grohé and 
Uribe, 2007; Bergin et al, 2007), and compared across regimes. Importantly, the source of 
cross regime welfare differences should lie in both the mean of consumption (first moment) 
and its variability (second moment)
4.  
                                                 
4 Traditionally, simulations in general equilibrium models have been based on first order log 
linear approximations which did not allow meaningful welfare comparisons under 
uncertainty (see for example Kim and Kim (2003)). As a remedy, we follow the literature 
using an algorithm developed by Schmitt Grohé and Uribe (2004), whose second order 
(continued…) 
Figure 3.  Chile: Central Government Balance and Public Debt 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Chile 
Chile: Central Government Balance and Public Debt   6 
 
The simulations reveal that some agents will prefer one rule over the other. As expected, 
macroeconomic  aggregates  are  less  volatile  under  the  acyclical  regime  than  under  the 
balanced  budget  regime,  since  expenditures  follow  a  smoother  path  under  former.
5  This 
especially benefits the non Ricardian consumers who are unable to smooth out volatility on 
their own.   
 
By contrast, Ricardians are better off under the balanced budget regime. Since they have 
access to capital markets and they can do their own smoothing, public efforts to smooth are 
redundant. Moreover, Ricardian households, unlike non Ricardian ones, can benefit from a 
stream of government spending that is higher (in the initial years) and more volatile. Only 
Ricardians can save: they smooth their consumption stream and build up assets that fund 
higher consumption in the outer years
6. Under the acyclical rule, the government postpones 
its spending, generating a negative wealth effect on the Ricardian consumers.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the model in its 
entirety. In Section III, we discuss the calibration of the parameters, present the simulation 
results and analyze the models' dynamics. In Section IV, we present the welfare analysis. 
Finally in Section V we summarize and conclude. 
 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
Our New Keynesian model most closely resembles one developed by Smets and Wouters 
(2002), but also draws on work by Woodford (2003), Clarida et al (1999), and Galí et al 
(2007).  However,  our  model  of  a  small  open  economy  also  includes:  hand to mouth 
consumers  (as  in  Galí  et  al,  2007),  capital  and  investment  with  adjustment  costs,  raw 
materials, government, Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (GHH 1988) preferences and a 
representative  “Ricardian” agent (rather than overlapping  generations). Our structure also 
                                                                                                                                                         
approximations permit us to assess the impact of policy induced variability over other key 
economic variables, including consumption. This type of approximation has been previously 
used to evaluate several issues, including the benefits of capital mobility and international 
risk sharing (Kim and Kim, (2003); the relative merits of fixed versus floating exchange rate 
regimes (Elekdag and Tchakarov, 2007; Bergin et al, 2007); optimal monetary and fiscal 
rules (Schmitt Grohé and Uribe, 2007). 
5  Also,  under  the  acyclical  rule,  the  government  avoids  some  of  the  undesired  currency 
appreciation—a Dutch disease that typically plagues non commodity exporters.   
6 Such an asymmetry generally presumes that there is an element of prudence (a non zero 
third  moment)  in  their  utility  function;  see  for  example  Carroll  and  Kimball  (2006).  A 
refinement of this argument is due to Huggett and Ospina (2001).      7 
follows  Gali  and  Monacelli’s  (2005)  model  of  a  representative  agent  with  two  goods 
(domestic  and  foreign)  by  using  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  consumption 
baskets  and  price  stickiness  à  la  Calvo  (1983).  We  close  the  small  open  economy  by 
introducing a risk premium, following Schmitt Grohé and Uribe (2003). Another essential 
reference among recent models for emerging economies is the general equilibrium model 
(GEM, Laxton and Pesenti, 2003). They have a very complex and more realistic structure to 
describe the relationship between final goods, intermediate goods and raw and semi finished 
materials.
 7  
 
A.  Households 
 
We assume a continuum of infinitely lived households indexed by  Î i  [0,1]. Following Galí 
et al. (2007), a fraction of households  l  consume their current labor income; they do not 
have access to capital markets and hence neither save nor borrow. Such agents have been 
termed  “hand to mouth”  consumers.  The  remainder  l - 1   save,  have  access  to  capital 
markets,  and  are  able  to  smooth  consumption.  Therefore,  their  intertemporal  allocation 
between  consumption  and  savings  is  optimal  (Ricardian  or  optimizing  consumers).  Both 
segments optimize on the intratemporal margin in labor markets.  
 
Consumption by Ricardian Households  
 
The representative household maximizes expected utility 
 
 ( ) 0 ( ), ( ) ,
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o t t t E U C i N i b
¥
= ∑           (1) 
 
Subject to the budget constraint 
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1 * * 1 *
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ( ) ) ( ),
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t t t t t t t t t t
o o
t t t t t t
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R B i S B R B i
- -
+ + +
= + - + -
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       (2) 
 
where  ) (i C
o
t  is consumption,  ) (i D
o
t  are dividends from ownership of firms, 
*
1 ( ) t B + F  is the 
country risk premium,  t S  is the nominal exchange rate,  ) (
* i B
o
t  denotes private net foreign 
assets, where we define a positive value of  ) (
* i B
o
t  as debt,  ) (i Wt  is nominal wage,  ) (i N
o
t  is 
the number of hours of work,  ( )
o
t B i  is government debt held by households,  t R and 
*
t R  are 
the gross nominal return on domestic and foreign assets (where  t t i R + =1  and 
* * 1 t i R
t + =  ) 
and  t T  are lump sum taxes.  
                                                 
7 Laxton and Pesenti (2003) also assume habit formation in consumption, different price setting, nontradable 
goods and adjustment costs for the demand for imports and nontradable goods.   8 
 
Our utility function (Correia et al, 1995) yields realistic values for consumption volatility:  
 










                       (3) 
 
Note that 1 s  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and 1 ( 1) j -  is 
the elasticity of labor supply to wages. The value of y  is calibrated to obtain a realistic 
fraction  of  steady  state  hours  worked.  Note  also  that  the  rate  of  relative  prudence  is 
( ) ) 1 ( / ) ( ) (
0 0 s y
j + - = - CC CCC t t U U i N i C . This statistic is important to explain precautionary 
savings     one of the  most important  results of this article. As other authors have noted 
(Carroll and Kimball, 2006), for any individual agent, unless this statistic is non zero, the 
level  of  consumption  (and  hence  savings)  will  be  invariant  to  volatility.  The  first order 
condition for consumption is: 
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Consumption by Hand-to-Mouth Households  
 
For “Non Ricardian” households, utility is:  
 




t             (6) 
 
We assume that these households neither save nor borrow (Mankiw, 2000). As a result, their 
level of consumption is given by their disposable income: 
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Labor Supply  
 
Symmetric with the goods markets (discussed below), the continuum of monopolistically 
competitive  households  supply  a  differentiated  labor  service  to  the  intermediate goods   9 
producing sector and a labor aggregator combines as much household labor as is demanded 
by firms, with a constant returns technology. The aggregate labor index has the CES form: 
 
w


















) (            (9) 
 
where  ) (i Nt  is the quantity of labor used from each household. The representative labor 
aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a chosen amount of the aggregate labor index, 
given each household’s wage rate  ) (i Wt . Then, she sells units of labor index at their unit 
cost  t W (with no profit), to the production sector: 
 
                    
              (10) 
 
 
Note that, while prices are sticky, wages are completely flexible. Nominal wages are set by 
households  so  as  to  maximize  their  intertemporal  objective  function  (1)  subject  to  the 
























) (                   (11) 
 
As a result the supply of each household is given by 
 
( )
1 ( ) 1 ( ) t w t W i N i
j q jy
- = +                   (12) 
 
where ( ) w q + 1 is a mark up over the current ratio of the marginal disutility of labor and the 
marginal utility of an additional unit of consumption. For rule of thumb households, wages 
are set at the average wage level of optimizing households.  
 
Demand for Domestic and Imported Consumption Goods 
 
Consumption is a CES aggregate of consumption of domestic  ) (i C
D
t  and imported goods 
) (i C
F
t , where  C h  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and 
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h a a                                        (13) 
 
The demand for each set of differentiated domestic and imported goods, as derived from 
expenditure minimization, is: 
 
                                  (14) 
               
 
              (15) 
 
 
A weighted average of either domestic or imported differentiated goods composes each type 
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for K= D (domestic) and F (foreign).  t P the aggregate consumer price index or CPI is 
defined as: 
 
            (18) 
 
where the respective  price index is: 
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where  K= D (domestic), F (foreign).  
 
B.  Firms 
 
Domestic intermediate-goods firms 
 
We  assume  a  continuum  of  monopolistically  competitive  firms,  indexed  by  Î j   [0,1] 
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intermediate good  firm,  indexed  by  ) ( j   corresponds  to  a  CES  combination  of  capital 
) ( j Kt and labor ) ( j Nt , to produce  ) ( j Y
D
t and is given by: 
 




where  t A  the technology parameter, and  s s  the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor, are both greater than zero. 
 
The firms’ costs are minimized taking as given the rental price of capital, 
k
t R and the wage, 
t W  subject to the production function (technology). The relative factor demands are derived 
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Thus, marginal cost is given by: 
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                            (22) 
 
When firm  ) ( j  receives a signal to optimally set a new price à la Calvo (1983), it maximizes 
the discounted value of its profits, conditional on the new price: 
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Where  the  probability  that  a  given  price  can  be  reoptimized  in  any  particular  period  is 
constant and is given by ) 1 ( D q -  and  D e  is the elasticity of substitution between any two 
differentiated goods. The price
* D
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where the discount factor  k t t + L , is: 
 
k t t + L , =
0 0
0 0
k t k t k t
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    -    
.  
 
Firms that did not receive the signal will not adjust their prices. Those who do reoptimize 
choose a common same price, 
* D
t P . Finally, the dynamics of the domestic price index 
D
t P is 
described by the equation: 
 
                                          
          (26) 
 
 
Intermediate-goods importing firms 
 
As in the domestic sector, price setting in the import sector reflects little exchange rate pass 
through in the short run (as in Galí and Monacelli, 2005, and Smets and Wouters, 2002). 
Such  an  assumption,  while  simplistic,  provides  realistic  simulations  (impulse  response 
functions). This sector consists of firms that import a homogenous good from abroad and 
turn  it  into  a  differentiated  foreign  good  for  the  home  market  using  a  linear  production 
technology. Import firms are only allowed to change their price when they receive a random 
price change signal. Thus, the dynamics of the import price index is also described by an 
equation similar to (24).  But in this case, firms reset their price in response to variations in 
the  exchange  rate  or  the  foreign  price;  they  optimally  charge  the  import  price  abroad 
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Note  ) 1 ( F q -   and  F e   have  the  same  definition  as  before  but  here  they  apply  to  the 
intermediate goods importing firms. 
 
Final goods distribution 
 
Total final output is expressed with a CES aggregator function (across firms). There is a 
perfectly competitive aggregator, which distributes the final good using a constant return to 
scale technology. It is valid for both K= D (domestic) and F (imported) goods: 
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( )
K
t Y j  is the quantity of the intermediate good (domestic or imported) included in the bundle 
that minimizes the cost of any amount of output  t Y . The aggregator sells the final good at its 
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where  t P  is the aggregate price index. Finally, demand for any good  ( )
K
t Y j depends on its 
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Optimizing investment firms and Tobin’s Q 
 
There are firms that produce homogenous capital goods and rent them to the intermediate 
goods firms. Firms are owned exclusively by Ricardian households. Firms invest the amount 
so as to maximize firm value:  
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The first order conditions are: 
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Equation (35) corresponds to Tobin’s Q: the marginal cost of an additional unit of investment 
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Demand for investment goods 
 
Overall investment is equal to a CES aggregate of domestic and imported goods. Where  I h  
is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and  I a  is the steady state 
share of domestic goods in total investment.  
 
1 1 1 1
1




























h a a                               (35) 
 
Demand for investment goods, domestic and imported respectively, is derived from 
expenditure minimization, namely:  
         




              (37) 
 
 
A  weighted  average  bundle  of  either  domestic  or  imported  differentiated  goods  thus 
comprises each type of investment good (a Dixit Stiglitz index): 
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There is a demand for each set of differentiated domestic goods, which in turn depends on 
both total consumption abroad and on the home price of domestic goods (relative to its price 
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D.  Aggregation 
 
Total consumption is a weighted sum of consumption by Ricardian and rule of thumb agents: 
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Since only Ricardian households invest and accumulate capital, total investment 
is equal to ( ) l - 1  times optimizing investment: 
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o
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Likewise, the aggregate capital stock is: 
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Again, only optimizing households hold financial assets: 
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Foreign assets (or debt) include fiscal 
* G
t B and private held assets
* o
t B : 
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Finally, in equilibrium each type of consumer works the same number of hours: 
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E.  Monetary policy 
 
Even while this paper focuses on fiscal policy, price stability requires there also be an active 
central bank. Thus, in abbreviated way, we also include monetary policy: the central bank 
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where R  is the steady state nominal interest rate,  t P  is total inflation, P  is steady state 
total inflation (assumed to be zero),  t YR  is GDP without the natural resource and  R Y  is 
steady state value.  
 
F.  Fiscal Policy 
 
The government budget constraint is: 
 
 
         (52)                                                 
 
 
where  t IT   is  total  revenue  (copper  and  otherwise), 
G
t B   is  domestic  public  debt, 
* G
t tB S =
G
t bB v  is public foreign debt (a fixed proportion of domestic public debt) and  t
G
t G P is 
public spending. 
 
There are two sources of revenue. A domestic (non copper) lump sum tax that is assume to 
to always be in steady state:  , t t PT PT t = " . By contrast, copper revenue, which varies each 
period, is defined as  ( )
cu cu
cu t t S P Q t where  cu t  is the share of the production of the natural 
resource (copper) owned by the government, 
cu
t P is the world price of copper, and 
cu Q  is the 




t t N N N = =
1 * * 1 * *
1 1 1 ( ( ) )
G G G G G
t t t t t t t t t t t t IT R B S B R B B S B P G
- -
+ + + + + F = + +  17 
(1 )
cu cu
t t P P e = + ,  where  (0, ). t cu N e s ￿   By  contrast,  the  quantity  of  copper  is  assumed 
constant: 
cu cu
t Q Q = .   
 
 
Simple fiscal rules 
 
Copper revenue is essentially “manna from heaven.” The government purchases goods and 
services  with  this  manna.    A  fiscal  rule  determines  the  intertemporal  allocation  of  such 
spending.   
 
This paper highlights fiscal rules that meet several criteria. The rule should be transparent 
and easily understood, as Kydland and Prescott (1977) emphasized. And, the government’s 
net asset position – debtor or creditor – must be bounded. Neither net debt nor assets may 
grow without limit.  
 
Our benchmark is a balanced budget (BB) rule:  
  
              (53a) 
 









B is  a  weighted  average  of  domestic  and  foreign held  government  debt.  While 
transparency is a subjective criterion, most would agree that a balanced budget rule is easy to 
understand. Also, by definition, government debt is bounded at a constant (zero) under this 
rule.   
 
However a drawback of this rule is that it exposes vulnerable consumers to market (copper 
price) volatility. We thus propose an alternative acyclcical (AC) or structural balance rule that 
provides a cushion against market volatility – especially for the non Ricardian (or “hand to 
mouth”) consumers who are unable to smooth their consumption stream. Under this rule, 
spending  is  linked  one to one  with  steady state  (or  structural     permanent)  government 
revenues less interest payments, but with a small adjustment factor for the debt level ( x m ).  
 
The AC rule is:   
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= - +  
   18 
Essentially,  under  the  AC  rule,  government  spending  tracks  steady state  revenues  more 
closely  than  current  revenues.  Under  AC,  spending  is  substantially  less  procyclical  than 
under BB. But, procyclicality is not entirely eliminated under AC.   When there is a adverse 
shock to copper prices  0 t e < , there is an incipient rise in future debt  ￿
1 0
G
t B + < . This raises the 
risk premium. According to the AC rule, expenditures must fall. Conversely, for a beneficial 
shock to copper prices  0 t e > , spending increases.  
 
Are public assets bounded under the AC rule?  To investigate conditions under which the 









Substituting  this  equation  (budget  constraint)  in the  fiscal  rule  (53b),  noting  that,  in  this 
special case,  ￿ ( 1) t t t R R R º - , and rearranging, we see that debt evolves between any two 




This equation converges if only if 0 1 1 x Rm < - < . Clearly,  x m  must be non zero. Otherwise, 
government debt would follow a random walk. To see this, consider a special case where 
0 x m = and  0 v = (no foreign debt):    
1
G G
t t B B + =            (53c) 
In this case, if copper prices equal their steady state value[ ( )]
cu cu cu cu
cu cu t t SP Q S P Q t t = , total 
government debt stays constant. If there is an adverse shock to copper prices and 0 x m = , the 
level of debt will go up to the point where revenues and expenditures are once again equated. 
Put differently, if 0 x m = , government debt will remain at its new level forever unless there is 
another shock. Thus, the model will not converge. 
 
 
What determines the behavior of public debt with the acyclical rule?  
 
If we take expectation of the last expression, in the simplified case, with not government 
foreign debt, we are using for illustration purposes, we get:  
 
( ) ( ) 1( ) ( ) ( )
G G G
t t t t t x t E B AC B AC E R B AC m + = - , 
 
where the change in the public debt depends negatively on its stock times the expression: 




t t t t t t R B B P G IT
-
+ = + -
( ) ( ) 1( ) 1 ( )
G G
t t x t t t B AC R B AC R IT IT m + = - + -  19 
 
( ) ( ) 1( ) ( )
G G
t t t t x t E B AC E R B AC m + D = - . 
 
We know that the interest rate E(Rt) also depends on
*
1 t B +  for our assumption on how the 
economy, through the risk premium, goes back to equilibrium after a shock takes the current 
account  out  of  balance  (see  equation  68  below).  To  be  precise,  we  assume  that,  if  the 
economy faces a negative shock and the government increases its debt level, there will be a 
higher interest rate (due to a hike in the risk premium), which will increase not only interest 
payments but also debt amortizations in the following periods by this amount ( ) t t x E R m , as is 
clear in the last equation.
8  
 
Conversely,  with  a  positive  shock  to  the  commodity  price,  the  interest  rate  will  post  a 
reduction due to the fall in the risk premium, which is associated to a lower debt level or 
even a positive asset position. More specifically, the difference equation for the government 
debt level tells us that, to warrant convergence, spending should increase by the expression: 
( ) t t x E R m whose absolute value is smaller than in the former case.
9  
 
In  summary,  spending  cuts  are  larger  than  spending  hikes  as  a  result  of  the  interaction 
between the mechanism that governs the behavior of the risk premium and the parameter that 
warrants stability of public debt ( x m ) in our rule. In other words,  ( ) 0
cu
t t t x E R shock to P m >   
<    ( ) 0
cu
t t t x E R shock to P m < .The difference between these two expressions depends on the 
elasticity of the risk premium to the level of debt, which determinates the wedge between the 
costs of external funds and the opportunity cost of the country’s own savings (the interest 
rate that the country obtains on its assets).
10 
                                                 
8 The assumption of a risk premium hike whenever the government debt goes up after a 
negative shock to the commodity price is valid even in the case in which all government debt 
is domestic, because the shock is temporary and Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this 
model due to the presence of hand to mouth consumers. Therefore, a higher government debt 
should imply a current account deficit. For the more general case in which the government 
holds both types of debt (foreign and domestic), this is also true as is clear in the impulse 
response of the current account (figure 4). 
9 In that case, the economy will take longer to run out of those assets and get back to 
equilibrium because, as the equation shows, a lower interest rate debilitates the positive 
increase in spending that is implied by the AC rule. 
10 Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) find that in emerging economies under uncertainty, the 
“aversion to a collapse in outlays leads the government to respect a "natural debt limit" equal 
to the annuity value of the primary balance in a fiscal crisis.” 
(continued…)   20 
 
The expected level of assets depends on the volatility of shocks, the elasticity of the risk 
premium to the level of debt, and the parameter  x m  (see Appendix 1 for an example).   
 
The small procyclical adjustments are asymmetric if copper price volatility is sufficiently 
high: the small contractions during bad times are slightly greater than the small expansions 
during good times. This ensures that the government’s position converges to one of a net 
creditor. If the government wants to smooth spending to provide a cushion against market 
volatility, it needs to have this buffer against the asymmetry built in the debt dynamics.In so 
doing, it performs a kind of precautionary saving that hand to mouth agents cannot do for 
themselves. Otherwise, the government will be forced to cut spending in the presence of 
negative  shocks  being  unable  to  implement  the  acyclical  spending  rule.  The  welfare 
implications of such a policy are explored in the next section.   
 
A more general fiscal rule 
 
It may be easily seen that rules BB and AC are merely two options along a continuum of a 
general rule (GR) whose form is: 
 
￿ ( ) ( )
G G
t t t x t r t P G GR IT R B IT IT m a   = - + + -         (54) 
 
Thus,  for  BB,  1, 0 x g a m = = ;  for  an  AC  regime, 0, g a =   and 
1 0 x R m
- < < .    For  other 
intermediate rules, 0 1, g a < <  and 
1 0 x R m
- < < . We may thus think of alternative pairings of 
[ , ] x g a m  as ways of introducing both the mean and variance of government spending in a 




Government demand for domestic and imported goods  
 
The government demands domestic and imported goods, according to:  
 
 
1 1 1 1
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h a a                                 (55) 
 
where  G h  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and  G a  is the 
steady state share of domestic goods in total government expenditure. 
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The demand for domestic and imported goods derived from expenditure minimization is 
given by: 
                                                    




                                        (57) 
 
 
Each type of good (domestic, imported) consumed by the government is composed of a 
weighted average of differentiated goods, which also consists of a Dixit Stiglitz index: 
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G.  Market-Clearing Conditions 
 
The factor market clearing conditions are total employment by all firms j: 
 
             (61) 
 
and full capital utilization 
            (62) 
 
 
The good market clearing condition is: 
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t t t t Y j C j I j G j X j = + + +       (63) 
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Adding up and simplifying yields the symmetric equilibrium for the domestic market:  
 
 
        (65) 
 
 
where the total supply of domestic goods equals total demand of the domestic produced good 
for consumption, investment, government spending and exports. Finally, the economy wide 
budget identity can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )
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Equation (66) has an intuitive interpretation. First note that GDP is the (approximately) sum 




      (67) 
 
 
Thus, according to the national income accounting identity, consumption must equal GDP 
minus investment (I) and government expenditures G plus foreign debt (positive values 
of
*
t B ), which is written:   
        (68) 
 
 
The risk premium ensures that the economy returns to the steady state
12, thus this variable 
increases with the foreign debt. 
 
 
III.  CALIBRATION AND DYNAMICS 
 
We choose Chile as our benchmark country for the calibration because it has been a leader 
within  emerging  commodity  exporters  in  implementing  an  acyclical  fiscal  rule.
13 
Unfortunately,  many  parameters  have  never  been  obtained  using  Chilean  data.  For  this 
reason, we calibrate the model taking sensible values from different studies (see Table 1).
14  
For  example,  the  discount  factorb is  0.99  close  to  the  values  found  elsewhere  in  the 
literature. The risk aversion coefficient s  is greater than one (2.0) as the evidence indicates 
for  small  open  economies.
15  Thus,  the  relative  prudence  coefficient  is: 
( ) ) 1 ( / ) ( ) (
0 0 s y
j + - = - CC CCC t t U U i N i C = 3.  This  ensures  that  Ricardian  agents  will  save 
more as output volatility rises.
16  
                                                 
11 We assume for simplicity that there are no private copper exports; we treat them as if they 
were transfers from abroad.  
12  See Schmitt Grohé and Uribe (2004). 
13 The steady state values are consistent with those obtained for the Chilean Economy where 
foreign debt is around 50 percent of the GDP. See for example Restrepo and Soto (2006). 
14 We assume that each period corresponds to one quarter. 
15 See Agénor and Montiel (1996), Table 10.1, page 353. 
16 For our chosen utility function, there is no closed form solution linking consumption and 
volatility.  An approximation is found in Talmain (1998).  
* ( ) ( )
D D F F F F cu cu
t t t t t t t t t t t PY P Y P Y S P Y S P Q = + - +
( ) ( )
1
* * * *
1 1 t t t t t t S B R B S B
-
+ + F -  24 
 
The elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods, D e and  F e ,  is 6, in order to have a 
mark up of 20%,  the fraction of firms that keep their prices unchanged each period, D q  and 
F q , is 0.75 and the rate of depreciation  d is 0.025.  All these values are standard in the 
literature on the New Keynesian models (Woodford (2003), Galí and Monacelli (2005) and  
Galí et al (2007)). 
 
 
Table 1. Baseline Parameters   
 
Discount factor (β)   0.99 
Risk aversion coefficient (σ)   2.00 
Disutility parameters, worked hours (N)    
     j   1.70 
     y   7.02 
Weight of rule of thumb consumers (λ)  0.50 
Rate of depreciation (δ)   0.025 
Investment adjustment cost f   1/15 
Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods (εD, εF )  6.00 
Parameter of CES production function (α )   0.40 
Fraction of firms that keep their prices unchanged (θD, θF)  0.75 
Real wage mark up (1+θW  )   1.20 
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (σS)   1.00 
Response of monetary authority to inflation (φπ)    1.50 
Response of monetary authority to output  (φyr)    0.00 
Autoregressive coefficient of copper price   0.80 
Share of the production of the natural resource owned by the government (tcu)  0.50 
Amount produced of the natural resource (Q
cu)   0.45 
Weight of domestic good in consumption (αC)   0.60 
Weight of domestic good in investment (αI)   0.50 
Weight of domestic good in government expenditure (αG)  0.99 
Foreign domestic good (consumption) elasticity of substitution (ηC)  0.99 
Foreign domestic good (investment) elasticity of substitution (ηI)  0.99 
Foreign domestic good (government) elasticity of substitution (ηG)  0.99 
Acyclical rule, debt weight ( X)  0.01 
The share of external public debt over total public debt  b v   0.21 
Elasticity of interest rate to external debt  0.001 




For the labor market, we suppose the same mark up as in the good market, i.e.     w q is 0.2. 
The value of j  (=1.7) comes from Correia et al (1995), who introduced GHH utility function 
in RBC models for small open economies to explain the higher volatility of the consumption 
observed in these countries.  As they do, we choose a value for y  (=7.02) to ensure that 
hours worked in steady state coincide with actual data in our benchmark country. The value   25 
of the investment adjustment cost  f is 1/15, which is half of the value of Correia et al 
(1995). Half of households are hand to mouth, i.e.  l  is 0.5, which is within the range of 
values considered in other studies (Mankiw (2000) and Galí et al (2007)). We assume that 
government  spending  is  heavily  biased  towards  domestic  goods.  Indeed,  the  share  of 
domestic goods in the government consumption basket  G a  is 0.99. 
 
This allows us to replicate a stylized fact: in many commodity exporting countries, increases 
in  government  spending  cause  real  appreciations  (Edwards,  1989).  We  do  not  have 
information about the values of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
goods  ( C h , I h ,  and  G h ),  thus  we  assume  values  close  to  1  one  (following  Galí  and 
Monacelli,  2005).  For the same reason we choose values for  C a and   I a  close to 0.5 (also 
following Galí and Monacelli, 2005) as a measure of openness.   
 
Even though public debt is not exactly zero in Chile, we assume it to be so in our model’s 
steady state. This assumption helps us to compare the acyclical rule with the balanced budget 
regime: to do so, both policies must share the same steady state.  Also, we assume that 21 
percent of public debt is held by foreigners ( b v =0.21); this value comes directly from historic 
Chilean data. In our baseline simulation, the coefficient in the monetary rule with respect to 
inflation  p f  is 1.5, which is a standard one for Taylor rules. The interest rate response with 
respect to the output gap  yr f  is assumed to be zero. Likewise, the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor  S s  is 1.0. Thus a  is the capital share and is assumed to be 0.4 
given that this value in Chile is higher than in other countries (in the US,  a =0.33). The 
elasticity of domestic exports to the real exchange rate 
* h is 1.0 in line with estimations for 
developing countries (Ghei and Pritchett, 1999).  
 
The autoregressive coefficient of the real price of copper  r  is 0.8 obtained from quarterly 
data from 1973 through 2005. We choose small values for the debt weight  X m  (=0.01) in the 
acyclical rule and the elasticity of the interest rate to external debt (0.001).  Both coefficients 
warrant the stability of the model. The first one makes public debt a stationary variable. The 
second one forces the current account to be stationary as well as net foreign assets.   
 
 
IV. EFFECTS OF A COMMODITY (COPPER) PRICE SHOCK 
 
To illustrate how the model economy works under the two extreme alternative fiscal rules, 
we discuss several shock experiments below. We simulate 100 artificial economies, 1000 
period each, hitting the economy with a random shock to the price of copper each period.
17 
                                                 
17 We also simulated the economy 10.000 periods ahead and the qualitative results did not 
change.   26 
  
To begin,  Figure 4 shows responses of several macroeconomic variables to one standard 
deviation (20%) copper price shock.
18  In each of the small charts, the black and grey blue 
lines represent impulse responses under balanced budget and acyclical structural balance, 
respectively.     
                                                 
18 The size of the shock in our simulations is just enough to obtain a standard deviation of the 
real price of copper similar to the empirical one (33%) for the period 1973 2005.   27 
Figure 4.  Responses to a Price of Copper Shock 
 (% change from steady state values)  
Government Revenues Government Expenditures Fiscal Deficit
GDP Consumption Ricardian Agent Consumption 
Hand-to-Mouth Agent Consumption  Hours Investment
Domestic Output Real Wage Rental Rate of Capital
Relative price (Pd/Pm) Nominal Interest Rate Inflation Rate
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Balanced Budget Acyclical Rule  28 
The balanced budget rule (black line) yields patterns that are generally procyclical. When 
copper  prices  increase,  so  do  government  revenues,  expenditures,  hand to mouth  private 
consumption, hours worked, and output. Likewise, the real value of the currency appreciates. 
Note that, to gauge real appreciation, we look at the relative price of the domestic good Pd/Pm.  
Since we assume that it is a good proxy for the inverse of the real exchange rate. The real 
appreciation also reduces non commodity exports. Inflation rises, as does the real interest 
rate  (via  the  Taylor  rule).  Note  however,  that  investment  falls:  capital  expenditures  are 
crowded out by the copper price boom.  
 
By contrast, the acyclical rule (grey blue line) displays behavior that is less procyclical. By 
definition, the behavior of government revenues is invariant to regime. However, government 
spending shows virtually no response to the shock. Instead the public balance is positively 
related to the copper price shock. GDP and consumption increase only slightly. In addition, 
the currency shows a much more modest appreciation than under the balanced budget rule, 
and exports remain largely unchanged. Inflation and interest rates remain unaffected, as does 
investment; there is no crowding out. Thus, for most variables, volatility is greater under the 
balanced  budget  rule  than  under  the  acyclical  rule.  One  important  exception  to  this 
observation is consumption by Ricardian households, who are able to almost fully neutralize 
the otherwise volatile effects of government policy.  
 
Some  other  crucial  differences  between  the  rules  are  shown  in  Figure  5a b.  There  is  an 
important difference regarding the evolution of government debt. Under the balanced budget 
regime, government debt is always, by definition, equal to its initial value, namely zero. By 
contrast, under the acyclical rule, the government accumulates assets. Over time, the average 
public debt stabilizes: B
g ≈ -30 percent of GDP. Our simulations of the AC rule confirm the 
explanation given in section II.F (fiscal policy) and Appendix 1. Our structural balance rule, 
which provides a cushion against market volatility, needs to have these assets as a buffer 
against  the  asymmetry  produced  by  the  volatility  of  shocks,  the  risk  premium  and  the 
mechanism that warrants the stationarity of public debt. 
 
Predictably,  consumption  by  “hand to mouth”  households  C
r  differs  substantially  across 
regimes. Under the acyclical rule, the variability of C
r is substantially smaller than under the 
balanced budget rule. This feature will be critical for our welfare comparisons between rules 
(below). At the same time, the level of C
r is somewhat higher under the acyclical rule. This 
reflects the fact that aggregate demand rises under the acyclical regime—a consequence of 
higher public expenditures, including higher real wages (W/P) and employment (N), which 
also help explain higher C
r.   
  
On the contrary, the variability of consumption by Ricardian households C
o does not differ 
much  across  regimes.  Ricardian  households  are  able  to  neutralize  most  of  the  volatility 
inherent in a balanced budget regime. The level of C
o stays flat over time under the acyclical 
rule, but rises slightly under the balanced budget rule. This reflects different saving rates and 
asset accumulation across regimes. Under the balanced budget regime, Ricardian households 
save more in the initial periods. They build up assets and hence are able to maintain their 
consumption level.    29 
Figure 5a. Average of Simulated Series 
Government expenditures  Public debt over GDP,%
Consumption  Hand-to-mouth agents Consumption  Ricardian agents
Employment Real wage
Real interest rate,% Relative Price (Pd/Pm)
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balanced budget rule acyclical rule  30 
Figure 5b. Average of Simulated Series 
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balanced budget rule acyclical rule  
 
Under the acyclical regime, asset accumulation by the government is mirrored by a decrease 
in private financial wealth, which belongs to Ricardians. Since the government saves, agents 
have lower income in the early periods and accumulate debt to finance their consumption. In 
the long run, consumption by Ricardians is lower because they need to pay interests on their 
debts.  
 
The intuition of the last result is directly related to the fact that Ricardian agents know how to 
save optimally, incorporating the variability of the commodity price shock. Thus, they have a 
strong  precautionary  saving  motive  (measured  by  the  rate  of  relative  prudence),  which 
stimulates  asset  build up  when  uncertainty  is  higher.  The  government  saves  following  a 
mechanical acyclical rule which is not optimal from the perspective of the Ricardian agents. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  government’s  asset  build up,  these  consumers  save  less.  This 
behavior can be observed in Graph 5.a and 5.b where, in our acyclical rule, while total and 
financial wealth decrease, government assets grow. On the contrary, Ricardians would prefer   31 
to receive those resources and administer them by themselves rather than giving that role to 
the  government, which postpones its spending infringing  a negative wealth effect on the 
Ricardian consumers.  
 
V.  CALCULATION OF WELFARE LEVELS 
 
A.  Methodology 
 
We follow Kollman (2002), Kim and Kim (2003), Elekdag and Tchakarov (2004), Bergin et 
al (2007) insofar as we also compute the second order approximations developed by Schmitt 
Grohé and Uribe (2004) to solve the whole system of equations of the model. In this way, we 
can include the effect of the volatility on the mean of consumption. Kim and Kim (2003) 
note, log linearized business cycle models are inappropriate for welfare analysis since they 
are unable to account for the effect of the variance of the shocks on economic decisions. 
Thus, we compute the welfare gains generated by moving from one rule to the other, finding 
the change in steady state consumption (x ) required to make any household indifferent (in 
expected utility terms) between the procyclical balanced budget and the acyclical spending 
rule.  Such  a  calculation  is  in  the  spirit  of  Lucas  (1987).  To  do  so,  we  start  taking 
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The specific second order approximation of the utility function (equation (3)) is: 
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=  and 
therefore ( ) ˆ ( ) XE X E X X = -  and ( )
2 ˆ ( ) X V X V X X = - . Next, to simplify, we write 
expected utilities under the procyclical balanced budget and the acyclical spending rule as 
1 ( , )
bb E U C N f   =    and 2 ( , )
ss E U C N f   =    , respectively.  
 
Now, note that: 
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Thus, the incremental consumption required to equate expected utility across regimes, (x )  is  
computed as: 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
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- -     -     - - + - -    -        =       (72) 
   
That is, x  shows how much additional consumption would be required to make an individual 
just as well off under a balanced budget regime as under an acyclical spending rule. 
 
The welfare gains of moving from one rule to the other were also computed using conditional 
measures of utility. This strategy takes into consideration the transition when one of the rules 
is applied because by computing the discounted sum of expected utilities, it considers the 
costs of sacrificing consumption for precautionary reasons when the balance budget is put in 
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B.  Results 
 
Before discussing the results in details, there are some impacts of the choice of fiscal rule 
that are quite intuitive and easy to see. 
 
Implication  (1):  Welfare  for  both  types  of  consumers  will  increase  when  government 
expenditures increase.  This implication is uncontroversial. It simply reflects the fact that the 
government has an exclusive right to spend its manna from heaven (copper revenues) when it 
chooses (according to the rule). More spending raises the demand for domestic (as well as 
imported) goods and services, whose ultimate suppliers are the economy’s households – both 
Ricardian and non Ricardian.  
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Implication (2): Discounted welfare for both types of consumers will increase when the time 
profile of government expenditures is shifted towards the present.  As before, this implication 
is simply a consequence of the government’s distribution rights for manna (copper). More 
spending  now  raises  the  demand  for  goods  and  services  supplied  by  the  economy’s 
households – now.   
 
Implication  (3):  Reducing  the  variance  of  government  expenditures  helps  non Ricardian 
consumers more than Ricardian ones; the latter are able to smooth their consumption stream 
on their own.  
 
Implication  (4):  Reducing  the  variance  of  government  expenditures  reduces  asset 
accumulation  by  Ricardian  consumers.  In  a  smoother  environment  (AC  versus  BB), 
Ricardians  have  less  incentive  to  save  on  a  precautionary  basis.  This  implication  is  not 
necessarily  bad  for  Ricandian  consumers.  Extra  saving  could  also  be  costly  in  terms  of 
welfare. 
 
Implication (5): For these reasons, it is expected that non Ricardians will prefer AC over BB 
while (based on the first two implications) Ricardians might prefer BB over AC.  
 
The results of this analysis are shown in Figures 5 and 6. To begin, Figure 5 shows the net 
welfare  gain  (measured  as  a  percent  of  steady  state  consumption)  implied  in  comparing 
acyclical versus balanced budget, against the variance of commodity prices.  
 
Figure 6.  Welfare Gain (WG) and Variance of Copper Prices (scopper)* 
































































WG: welfare under acyclical minus welfare under balanced budget regime (measured in percent of steady state 
consumption).  
 
As  Figure  5.a  has  already  foreshadowed,  “hand to mouth”  consumers  benefit  from  the 
acyclical rule, not only because their consumption stream is smoother, but also because it is 
slightly higher. On the other hand, Ricardian consumers loose with this rule. However, the 
loss computed with the conditional expectation formula is smaller because, as said, it takes   34 
into  account  the  consumption  foregone  whenever  the  agent  is  involved  in  precautionary 
saving. The right panel in Figure 6 shows that average welfare goes up with the acyclical rule 
if one weighs both consumers equally. 
 
Figure 6 suggests that the larger is the variance of the shock scopper,, the higher is the “hand to 
mouth” welfare. Figure 7 shows why: as s
copper grows, so does C
r under the acyclical regime, 
both absolutely and relative to the balanced budget regime. An analogous result holds for 
government  expenditure.  Hence,  “hand to mouth”  agents  benefit  from  the  (Keynesian) 
demand stimulus, which results from the acylical spending rule.   
 
By  contrast,  Ricardian  agents  suffer  somewhat  under  the  acyclical  rule  relative  to  the 
balanced budget rule. Their consumption is slightly less volatile under the acyclical regime 
(Figure  4).  However,  in  the  more  volatile  balanced budget  environment,  Ricardian 
households build their own precautionary assets, that include capital stock—from which they 
are able to later consume. Figure 6 supports these results. It shows that as scopper grows, the 
Ricardian  agents’  consumption  C
o  under  the  acyclical  rule  decreases.  Once  again,  this 
reflects their lower asset levels that they do not build up in a more certain environment (a 
lower precautionary savings motive). As a result, their earnings and average consumption 

























   35 
Figure 7. Difference between regimes 
(acyclical minus balanced budget rule for different commodity price volatilities) 
Private Net Wealth, % Consumption Ricardian Agents,%
Total Public Debt over GDP,% Government Consumption, %
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*Each line is the average of the series that resulted from the simulations with the  
acyclical spending rule minus those obtained with the balanced budget rule.  
 
In other words, even though the government has a mechanical acyclical rule it acts as if itself 
were an agent with a precautionary savings motive: it builds up a prudential asset stock that 
cushions spending today against shocks while also permitting it to spend more in the future. 
In turn, this provides a beneficial externality for "hand to mouth consumers:" the government 
is  providing  a  substitute  for  the  precautionary  savings  that  they  themselves  cannot  do. 
Figure 7  illustrates,  under  the  acyclical  rule  that  the  government  does  what  Ricardian 
consumers would otherwise do under the balanced budget regime.  It accumulates a large 
amount of assets and ends up with larger revenues and spending. The stock of assets can 
amount to a large share of GDP if uncertainty increases steadily. Nevertheless,  and as we 
explained in Section 3.2, the mechanical acyclical rule causes an accumulation of assets that   36 
is far from being optimal from the perspective of the Ricardian consumers and hence the 
welfare of this kind of agents is much lower with the acyclical rule.
19  
 
These results also have important implications for the design of a general fiscal rule (see 
equation 54). Recall that under a completely acyclical regime, ar=0 and under a balanced 
budget regime, ar=1. By contrast, mx is a debt targeting parameter: an increase in the value of 
mx implies that the government is targeting more closely the debt stock (the target is the initial 




Table 2 shows the average welfare gains obtained using the conditional expectations for a 
given volatility of the commodity price shocks, as measured in consumption units for both 
consumers over a grid of values for mx and ar.  
 
Table 2. Average welfare gains 
  x a   0  0.25  0.5  0.75  1 
0.010  0.1038  0.0981  0.0792  0.0447  0.00 
0.033  0.1076  0.1008  0.0810  0.0456  0.00 
0.055  0.1091  0.1016  0.0828  0.0480  0.00 
0.078  0.1085  0.1032  0.0831  0.0486  0.00 
 
 
x m  
0.100  0.1075  0.1047  0.0861  0.0495  0.00 
 
As one would expect, raising either mx or ar helps Ricardians but hurts hand to mouth units. 
However, raising mx is not identical to raising ar. Table 2 suggests that, if we maintain the 
acyclical element (keep at = 0) but increase somewhat the debt targeting parameter mx, we 
can benefit Ricardian agents at a very small cost to the hand to mouth agents. But, no such 
result  can  be  obtained  by  raising  ar:  while  Ricardian  households  always  gain,  the  loss 
suffered by “hand to mouth” households is even greater. Intuitively, ar is a larger and blunter 
instrument than mx. If mx rises, the stock of debt (or assets) must return to zero more quickly 
than otherwise. If ar rises, more volatility is introduced directly— through the commodity 
price channel. By contrast, if mx rises, more volatility in introduced but less directly—through 
the spending channel.  
 
                                                 
19  Note that the composition of assets is not invariant to the fiscal rule. The acyclical rule 
encourages more domestic investment in physical capital than the balanced budget. Lower 
volatility encourages more plant and equipment to be built within the country. By contrast, 
higher volatility under the balanced budget regime encourages Ricardian consumers to invest 
abroad due to the precautionary saving motive and the absence of domestic bonds. 
 
20  In a more general context, when target debt b
* is, for example, 50 percent of GDP, a term 
like mx (bt – b*) would be necessary in the rule.   37 
Indeed, we find that, conditional on ar = 0, there is a value of mx that maximizes average 
welfare  gains.  Therefore,  we  say  that  it  is  the  best  degree  of  government  spending 
stabilization.  So long as the gain to Ricardian consumers from increasing mx exceeds the loss 
suffered by “hand to mouth” agents, the former can compensate the latter. Note however, that 
such an optimum will only coincide with one that a social planner would choose for a special 
case,  namely  where  the  social  planner’s  weights  on  the  utility  of  “hand to mouth”  and 
Ricardians coincide exactly with the values of l and (1 l), as defined above.  
 
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We  assess  the  welfare  implications  of  reducing  the  volatility  and  procyclicality  of 
government expenditures in countries that specialize in a primary resource based commodity 
export, facing strong fluctuations of their fiscal income due to commodity price volatility.  
Public  spending  does  contribute  to  aggregate  demand  (a  Keynesian  channel)  and  hence 
output. Importantly, government expenditure was assumed to be useless. This is so because 
our focus is to understand under this extreme assumption if there is some role for government 
spending in stabilizing external shocks and the business cycle. 
 
Our policy, an acyclical spending rule, was geared to helping the most vulnerable “hand to 
mouth” consumers. We found that the policy was effective: it provided a substitute financial 
cushion,  hence  reducing  the  volatility  of  their  consumption  and  increasing  welfare.  This 
policy boosted their mean consumption through (Keynesian)  aggregate  demand channels. 
However, others in society did not fare so well. “Ricardian” households that were able to 
optimize over time suffered. Initially, they saved less, a response that we would expect from 
agents with a precautionary saving motive. Their consumption was slightly less volatile, but 
over  time  their  average  consumption  was  also  less.  This  negative  wealth  effect  has  an 
intuitive  interpretation:  effectively,  under  the  acyclical  spending  rule,  government 
accumulates assets and limits what was the role of Ricardian households, namely to smooth 
consumption administering their assets optimally. 
 
An obvious alternative way of increasing consumers’ welfare is relaxing one of our modeling 
assumptions and allowing public spending to be useful.  This is equivalent to giving back 
part of government spending to the consumers reducing our lump sum taxes. However, we 
do  not  consider this  case here  since  we  are  tracing  specifically  the  effect on  welfare of 
stabilizing government spending. 
 
We  found  the  best  degree  of  spending  stabilization  by  moving  slightly  away  from  the 
perfectly acyclical rule, what increases the welfare of the Ricardian households at a low cost 
to the hand to mouth households. If the asset position of the government is limited through a 
somewhat more aggressive debt (asset) targeting stance (in our model a slightly higher mx); 
Ricardians  saved  more  initially  than  before,  building  up  more  assets,  hence  boosting 
consumption and welfare. In other words, with full capital mobility and financial market 
participants having access to a wide range of financial instruments, it may be better (welfare   38 
reaches a higher level) also to include a debt / asset target—even at the expense of extra 
volatility in expenditures.
21   
 
In  conclusion,  if policy  makers  wish to  cushion  society’s  most  vulnerable  agents—those 
without access to capital markets and who have presumably the lowest wealth, our results 
show  that  fiscal  policy  should  de link  public  expenditures  from  current  revenues.  We 
conclude that the acyclical rule, in this context, has a positive effect on the welfare of society 
as a whole depending on how restricted, financially, the consumers truly are.
22 
                                                 
21 This could be implemented empirically through infrequent revisions of permanent income 
and spending. 
 
22  This  paper  also  touches  upon  some  more  general  issues  in  optimal  fiscal  policy.  For 
example, our optimal debt level is, essentially, a net credit position (in average). This is 
similar to a conclusion found in Aiyagari et al (2002). In this aspect, our work recognizes that 
one goal of a government is to provide a financial cushion for “hand to mouth” households 
that are unable to do so for themselves (Tanner and Carey, 2005).        
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Appendix 1: Asymmetries and the risk premium 
 
Given that our artificial economy does not have an analytical solution, we use an example to 
illustrate how the wedge (the risk premium) between the costs of external funds and the 
opportunity cost of the country produces an asymmetry in the model.  
 
We assume in this simpler case that the premium depends on public debt. Thus, the complete 
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Substituting (2) into (1), we get an equation for explaining the dynamics of the public debt. 
 
( ) 2 1 1 1 1 1 x B R B R m e = - -           (A3) 
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Substituting (A4) into (A3) and expressing the new equation in terms of  2 B , we have: 
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Assuming that shocks are distributed in such a way that  t "  there is the same probability of 














It is possible to compute the expected value of the debt level in the second period 2 B :   43 
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   (A6) 
 
We can study equation (A6) to comprehend the role of parameters  x and ω, and the size of 
e  in the dynamics of the public debt  
 
Case A1. If  x >0 and ω=0, the dynamics towards the steady state is determined completely 
by the parameter  x.  
 
( ) ( )
*
2 2 1 1 x E B B R B m = = -         (A6’) 
 
Nevertheless, there are no asymmetries because the wedge between the costs of external and 
domestic funds has no effect on the foreign interest rate that is relevant for the domestic 
economy. 
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    (A6’’) 
 
This expression is rearranged as follows:  
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We can gain further intuition of this equation examining the case of  ¥ ® e , i.e., the variance 
of the shock tends to infinity. Only with very large values of e , the expected value of B2 is 
negative and depends on ω.  
 
( ) 2





    = - + = - <     -    
    (A8) 
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Thus, the parameter that governs the bias of a net credit position of the government is ω. We 
observe that this expression can tend to zero if  0 ® e , indicating that this bias also depends 
positively on the degree of uncertainty (variance). Finally, these parameters interact jointly 
with the parameter  x to define the final size of the asymmetry.  
 
( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 x E B E R B m D = -  
 
In the presence of debt, bad times, 
bad R  is large and so is 
bad R m  while  whenever B is 
negative, the good times, 
good R  is small, thus 
good R m  is also small. Therefore, in the bad 




Why the government accumulates assets in our model? 
 
In a simple case of three periods we show that equation A7 will force the government to 
accumulate assets as a cushion that allows it to fulfill at the same time the fiscal rule 
(spending smoothing) and the transversality condition ie avoiding to be at the end of the 
world with a positive debt. 
 
Figure A1 Possible outcomes for Spending and Debt in an economy with three periods 












































































































































In figure A1 we show all the possibilities for the evolution of debt/assets in a world with 
three periods, whenever shocks are distributed as before with sizee  or  e - . Given that the 
world ends in period 3, the transversality condition imposes that 3 B  should be smaller or 
equal to zero, ie., the government could not have outstanding debt at the end of the world. 
However, given that in equation A7 the expected value of debt in period 2 is positive, in 
some of the four cases in the figure this condition does not hold. In particular, it does not 
hold in case (1), the top branch of the figure, in which the shocks were both negative (periods 
two and three). This is also true in the second branch in which the first shock was negative 
and the second one was positive. Given, that the government must fulfill the transversality   45 
condition in all cases, it accumulates assets based on the worst scenario (1) in order to be 
covered in all four possible results.  
Using the equality in row 1 of the figure: 
3 3
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Which should be smaller or equal to zero for the transversality condition to hold: 3 0 B £ . 
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In conclusion, due to uncertainty, the government accumulates assets to be able to follow the 
fiscal rule, and at the same time meet the transversality condition in all possible cases. The 
larger the variance of the shocks (e ), the more it saves. 